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Angry, Young Men 
 
February 13, 2018 
by Chris Rennie 
 
A recent study funded by the German government’s Federal Ministry for Family Affairs attributed 
a ten percent rise in violent crime within Lower Saxony, a German state, to migrants settled in the 
region. Criminologists postulated that, between 2014 and 2016, migrants were responsible for 
ninety-two percent of the increase in violent crime. Critics of the German 
government’s accommodating refugee policy have celebrated the study’s conclusion as hard proof 
that migrants are having a detrimental impact on German society. 
Long dormant, right-wing nationalism has stirred in Germany for the first time since the 1930s. 
With its surprising electoral victories last year, far-right Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) became 
the third-largest party in a fragmented German parliament. The AfD had rallied conservative 
voters with its promise to end non-European immigration to Germany. Speaking to the German 
parliament this month, an AfD politician underscored his party’s legislative agenda: “[the] 
incentives to come here must end.” Their first proposal was a bill amending Germany’s Residence 
Act to prohibit refugees already in Germany from inviting close relatives to the country. 
Currently, Section 27 of the Residence Act permits dependents of migrants to emigrate to 
Germany “so that they can live together as a family…to protect marriage and the family.” Family 
reunification, sometimes called chain migration, has been central to European immigration policies 
since the conclusion of the Second World War. In the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, European nations established that “[the] family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” 
Christian Pfeiffer, the criminologist who was the principal author of the German government’s 
study on violent crime, noted that refugees fleeing warzones in the Middle East were less likely to 
commit violent crimes overall. Migrants from North Africa, however, were overrepresented in the 
crime statistics. The difference between these two populations was that Middle Eastern migrants 
comprised all levels of society, while the North African migrant population was almost exclusively 
male, between fourteen and thirty years old. 
Unlike migrants from Syria and Iraq, migrants from North Africa cannot qualify for asylum in 
Germany. While some may receive temporary “subsidiary protection,” many arrive in Germany 
and cannot secure any legal immigration status. They often remain, working in shadow economies 
or not working at all, as German immigration officials struggle against logistical and procedural 
hurdles to deport them. 
The link between idle young men with no social standing and the commission of violent acts 
is extremely strong. The author of the study on violent crime himself hypothesized that “the lack 
of women has a negative effect” on the development of healthy norms of masculinity. It is 
somewhat surprising, then, that the AfD has cited the study to justify a more restrictive policy on 
family reunification. In fact, the study offered family reunification as a possible solution to the 
problem of violent crime committed by migrants. 
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This should come as no surprise to those who attempt to understand the nuances of the migration 
crisis. There are now more than 65 million migrants displaced around the world, the most in human 
history. With displacement comes violence and extremism that a stable society would otherwise 
sublimate or redirect. Although the Migration Policy Institute ranks German immigration policies 
in general as slightly more comprehensive than the rest of Europe, the German government’s 
family reunion policies rank twenty-fourth out of thirty-eight European countries. 
National policies leading to social exclusion increase the risk of poverty. In recognition of this, the 
European Union has funded an initiative to significantly mitigate risk factors of poverty by 2020. 
Germany, like many Western nations, now faces a choice: submit to extreme nativism based on 
ideals of ethnic purity or attempt to solve the ills of displacement by extending hospitality to the 
stranger from foreign lands. 
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Brexit Bill Will Leave Glaring Hole in Human 
Rights in the UK 
February 21, 2018 
by Abbey Reynolds 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). This decision 
has come to be known as “Brexit” and was met with shaky support, to say the least. The departure 
will happen on March 29, 2019, but the UK is already discussing how the government is going to 
handle this transition. A bill called the European Union Bill was recently introduced to Parliament 
which, if passed, will essentially end the primacy of EU law within the UK. Effectively, the bill 
will lump all EU legislation together with current UK law and over time, the government will 
decide which parts to keep or remove. Even more troubling, one of the most fundamental pieces 
of EU legislation that will not be transferred to the UK is the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (“Charter”). The language of the bill reads, “the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part 
of domestic law on or after exit day.” 
By passing the Brexit bill as it currently stands, the government of the United Kingdom will leave 
many societal groups without adequate protection under the law. This glaring hole has caused 
many civil rights bodies, such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and 
Amnesty International, to warn against the bill. Excluding the protections of this Charter would 
“cause legal confusion and … gaps in the law,” says chair of the EHRC, David Isaac. The main 
problem with losing the Charter is that it provides a certain number of rights and judicial remedies 
that do not have an equivalent in UK law. According to the EHRC, rights that would be lost without 
a direct replacement in UK law include a “freestanding right to non-discrimination, protection of 
a child’s best interests and the right to human dignity.” The current legislation protecting human 
rights in the UK is the Human Rights Act, but this fails as a defense to violation of human rights 
because it does not override acts of Parliament. The Charter is essential to providing an adequate 
remedy for violation because it will prevail over an act. 
The government continues to insist that current UK law contains equivalent protections to those 
in the Charter. The bill was almost defeated last year, but the government kept it alive by promising 
to conduct a “right-by-right analysis,” explaining how the current protections in the Charter will 
be guaranteed after the exit. The Labour Party, however, was unsatisfied with the 
analysis, calling it “woefully inadequate” and proposing an amendment to preserve the provisions 
of the Charter. The amendment was voted down by Parliament on January 16, 2018. 
The UK has a duty to its citizens to provide them with certain basic protections, based on 
their adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR influenced the 
1998 Human Rights Act, from which the country’s current human rights protections stem. The 
Human Rights Act provides certain basic protections, such as the right to life, freedom from 
torture, and freedom from slavery, among others. The EU Charter provides a stronger defense of 
fundamental rights because it overrides acts of the Parliament when there is a conflict over basic 
rights, making it a much stronger legal defense when combatting violations of human rights. The 
government contends that the citizens of the UK are protected through the democratic process, 
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assuming that the ability to elect Members of Parliament is an adequate assurance that their 
representatives will protect their basic rights. It seems foolish, however, to found an entire group’s 
basic rights protection solely on the goodwill and moral compass of the government, even if that 
government has been democratically elected. 
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European Court of Human Rights Declares 
Detention Arbitrary in Case of Man Held for 
Over a Decade in Romanian Psychiatric 
Institution 
June 22, 2018 
by Mariela Galeazzi* 
On November 7, 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided  “N v. 
Romania” and declared that the State had violated the right to personal liberty of N, a man 
diagnosed with paranoid affective psychosis, who was detained in several psychiatric institutions 
for over fifteen years after being accused of incest, “sexual corruption” of his daughters, 
and rape of his wife. 
Although N was never found criminally guilty and did not face a trial, his record of a psychiatric 
diagnosis and related alleged dangerousness allowed a criminal court to issue a “compulsory 
confinement” measure against him. This measure resulted in his physical imprisonment in a 
psychiatric hospital and required him to undergo medical treatment. Over the course of a decade 
all attempts to challenge that decision were dismissed by local courts on the basis of his psychiatric 
diagnosis, alleged dangerousness, and “lack of social and family support” until he was released on 
February 21, 2017 under less restrictive but still “compulsory” treatment measures. 
The case against N started in 2001 following an article in the Romanian national press and a 
television program. The Public Prosecutor opened a criminal procedure to investigate N, but 
ultimately decided to close the case after hearing from N’s wife and daughters. The Prosecutor 
considered, with regard to the charges for incest, that there was not enough evidence. With respect 
to the charges for rape, he contended that the accused’s wife did not fill out the required criminal 
complaint. Finally, regarding the charges for “sexual corruption,” the decision to close the 
investigation was based on the accused’s “lack of discernment” regardless of the existence of 
sufficient evidence to prosecute. Instead of advancing the investigation and trial, the Prosecutor 
requested that the court impose a “compulsory confinement” measure (Art. 114 Criminal Code of 
Romania) based on the fact that N “suffer[ed] from chronic paranoid schizophrenia” and was 
unclear as to the acts he committed. 
N challenged the order of detention several times throughout almost ten years, but his petitions 
were systematically rejected on the basis of medical forensic reports and the dangerousness charge 
groundlessly associated with both his diagnosis and his criminal record. In his petition to the 
ECtHR, he requested the tribunal to order the State to “ensure, at all cost . . . his transition from 
life in an institution to life in the community, by providing him with the necessary support in 
exercising his legal capacity, seeking proper housing and obtaining psychological assistance.” The 
 
* The author, Mariela Galeazzi, is a fellow of the Disability and Human Rights Fellowship Program (Center of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law) sponsored by the Open Society Foundations (OSF). The opinions expressed 
herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily express the views of OSF. 
Europe & Central Asia Coverage Spring 2018 
 6 
Court instead ordered the State to comply with the local decision issued on February 21, which did 
not contain any provision to follow-up after his release or ensure he had the necessary support to 
reintegrate into the community. 
When analyzing the arbitrariness, the ECtHR found that the local courts failed to assess the 
dangerousness of N according to local legislation or ECtHR jurisprudence, as they had “referred 
purely and simply to the findings of the forensic medical report.” Also, it highlighted that local 
courts did not examine whether alternative measures could have been applied in this case to 
promote N’s inclusion in the community. On these grounds, the ECtHR concluded that the 
detention had no legal basis since 2007 and, therefore, violated the right to security and liberty, 
including the right not to be unlawfully detained enshrined in Article 5.1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, it pointed out that although local courts eventually 
authorized N’s release, that measure was not achieved due to the lack of assessment of the needs 
of N or the lack of appropriate “reception facilities” in the community.  Finally, the Court 
recommended the State to consider the adoption of general measures to ensure that the detention 
of individuals in psychiatric institutions is lawful and that they are granted “access to a judicial 
appeal accompanied by appropriate safeguards.” 
While this decision might be considered appropriate to the extent that it criticized the actions and 
procedures of local authorities, ordered the release of N, and recommended that the State adopt 
general measures of access to justice, the ECtHR missed the opportunity to advance the rights of 
persons with psychosocial disabilities within criminal law systems according to international 
human rights law and standards. More specifically, it reinforced an interpretation of the right to 
liberty that has already been considered discriminatory against persons with disabilities. 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) affirms the principle of 
equality (Art. 2) and states that persons with disabilities have the right to be recognized “as persons 
before the law” and “enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life” (Arts. 
12.1 and 12.2). It further states that the existence of a disability “shall in no case justify a 
deprivation of liberty” (Art. 14.1). In addition, the CRPD Committee has specifically rejected the 
link between diagnosis and dangerousness as a ground for involuntary treatment or detention. It 
affirmed that “the involuntary detention . . . based on risk or dangerousness . . . or other reasons 
tied to impairment or health diagnosis” amounts to arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
Accordingly, when it comes to criminal responsibility, the Committee has stated that persons with 
disabilities have the same right to stand trial, to face a fair trial, and to eventually be found 
criminally responsible or absolved by a court or jury of their peers, just as every other citizen. 
Throughout that process and after it, persons with disabilities should be provided with “support 
and accommodations as may be needed.” If pre-trial detention is necessary, the decision to impose 
it should be guided by the universal principles of innocence and non-discrimination, and it should 
be subjected to judicial review with all the guarantees of due process of law conceded to every 
person. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated, in line with the CRPD 
Committee, that persons with disabilities who are deprived of their liberty should be offered “the 
same substantive and procedural guarantees available to others.” In compliance with this, States 
should ensure that persons with disabilities have “the opportunity to stand trial promptly, with 
support and accommodations as may be needed, rather than declaring [them] incompetent.” The 
reason underlying these standards is that the imposition of a compulsory measure is a punishment 
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without trial, based on a discriminatory distinction on the basis of a disability. The same position 
is maintained by the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNSUP), stating 
that “[t]hose of us who commit crimes should be dealt with under the criminal justice system, with 
appropriate supports to allow us to stand trial.” 
On the other hand, a number of United Nations bodies accept, though under restricted 
circumstances, the involuntary detention of persons with disabilities. The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee accepts the involuntary detention of persons with disabilities as a “last resort” 
and for the “shortest appropriate period of time,” with the “purpose of protecting the individual in 
question from serious harm or preventing injury to others.” With regards to pre-trial detention, this 
Committee has considered that it should be used only where it is “lawful, reasonable, and 
necessary,” clarifying that necessary means to “prevent flight, interference with evidence or the 
recurrence of crime,” or when the person constitutes a “clear and serious threat to society.” The 
Human Rights Committee has also highlighted that the seriousness of the crime cannot justify 
prolonged pre-trial detention. However, it is not clear to what extent the dangerousness (which in 
practice is usually associated with some diagnosis, as in the case under analysis) would justify 
prolonged pre-trial detention or involuntary detention for the purpose of “protection.” In addition, 
the Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture considers that when a person detained by a 
state “suffers serious mental disorders . . . the placement in a psychiatric facility may be necessary 
to protect the detainee from discrimination, abuse and health risks . . . provided that . . . the 
placement is subject[ed] to constant judicial review.” These standards conflict with those of other 
human rights bodies mentioned above, because instead of recognizing persons with disabilities’ 
right to stand trial and ensuring them the right to a fair trial with all the guarantees that every 
person should have in a criminal procedure, they authorize involuntary detention. 
In Romania, like in many states around the globe, criminal laws and procedures contain security 
measures as an alternative to prison for those persons with psychosocial or intellectual disabilities 
who are accused— but not convicted—of the commission of a crime. This has raised the concern 
of the CRPD Committee in its Concluding Observations to several countries. Security measures 
rely on the idea that because of their condition, persons with disabilities are unable to stand trial. 
Security measures usually consist of detaining persons in mental health institutions and forcing 
them to undergo psychiatric treatment (usually for many years). The existence of security measures 
has been the object of strong criticisms in terms of due process concerns because of their punitive 
characteristics and the fact that they are applied against people who have not yet been criminally 
convicted. Those critics led to the development of procedural guarantees and safeguards to control 
the imposition of security measures and prevent abuse or arbitrariness. However, this is not 
enough. Since the approval of the CRPD and according to the standards issued by the CRPD 
Committee, these measures should no longer exist because they violate the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination and the right to liberty in person for individuals with disabilities. In fact, 
the CRPD Committee has recently recommended “eliminate[ing] the security measures that 
involve forced medical and psychiatric treatment in institutions.” Along the same line, the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has recommended the promotion of 
critical theoretical research in the area of criminal law to “address the issue of criminal 
responsibility of persons with disabilities and the subjective element of crime,” by exploring the 
use of “impairment neutral” criteria. 
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According to the analysis above, if the ECtHR would have followed the CRPD standards—as they 
affirmed to have done—the outcome should have been different. However, adjudicating in 
compliance with the CRPD might have demanded a deeper revision of the wording of ECHR and 
ECtHR jurisprudence. This is because both EHCR and ECtHR jurisprudence contain provisions 
and standards that might be considered outdated in the light of current international law standards. 
For example, Article 5.1(e) of the ECHR, approved almost seventy years ago, established that 
those who are of “unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts” can be detained in different 
circumstances than those who are not, regardless of what they might or might not have done. Also, 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR established a test according to which a detention is lawful when 
the “alienation” is “conclusively established,” and the “disorder [is] of a character and a scope that 
legitimize[s] internment.” In light of the norms and standards analyzed above, it can be argued that 
Article 5.1(a-f) is discriminatory on its face because it treats those affected by infectious diseases, 
minors, and migrants differently. Besides, the ECtHR’s diagnosis-centered interpretation of this 
article undermines the universal principle of non-discrimination and the right to liberty in person 
as recognized in the CRPD. 
Recognizing and protecting the rights of persons with disabilities requires a revision of local and 
regional human rights laws and standards that harmonizes them with the CRPD and the CRPD 
Committee decisions. In this harmonization task, it would be beneficial to take into account the 
ECtHR’s consolidated jurisprudence that considers the European Convention to be a “living 
instrument” allowing for varied interpretations. A decision consistent with the CRPD standards 
would have allowed the ECtHR to notice that local legislation and practices did not guarantee the 
right of N to be treated as an equal, since he was denied the right to stand trial and defend himself—
with appropriate support—from the criminal charges. Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, a 
positive outcome of the decision is its general recommendation to the State to ensure “access to 
judicial appeal with judicial safeguards.” Hopefully, this recommendation may trigger the review 
and reform of local legislation in Romania with the aim of guaranteeing the right of liberty of 
persons with disabilities and their right to stand trial on an equal basis with others, with the 
accommodations and safeguards that the circumstances may demand. 
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The Excluded: Albanian Nationals’ Right to 
Vote From Abroad and the International and 
Regional Approaches 
June 28, 2018 
by Emirjon Kaçaj* 
Introduction 
This article examines the right to vote from abroad by focusing on the case of Albania, which does 
not provide for out-of-country voting. It argues a progressive affirmation of the right to vote from 
abroad, which requires Albania and other countries to undertake positive measures to organize 
inclusive and democratic elections that ensure wide participation and free expression of the opinion 
of the people. With 40% of its citizens residing abroad, this article argues that Albania should 
allow for voting by mail, electronically, provide polling stations in embassies and consulates, or 
other methods that ensure inclusive democratic elections.[1] 
Background 
With a resident population of 2.8 million there are around 3.5 million registered voters in 
Albania.[2] This is a clear sign that Albania has a large number of emigrants registered in voters’ 
lists. In fact, about 40% of the country’s population resides abroad.[3] For instance, around 
455,468 Albanian migrants reside in Italy, 429,428 live in Greece and 90,381 in the United 
States.[4] 
About 1.2 million Albanian registered voters can not exercise their right to vote from 
abroad.[5] Thus, Albanian migrants have to travel back home on voting day in order to participate 
in elections.[6] Currently, Albania does not provide for the possibility to vote by mail, in 
diplomatic representations around the world, or electronically.[7] Consequently, the “exclusion” 
of about 35.6% of voters due to their physical presence out of the country, significantly affects the 
outcome of the elections.[8] Others argued that migrants lose their ties with their country of origin 
and therefore should not be entitled to vote from abroad.[9] However, remittances at 8.8% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) indicate that Albanian migrants have a significant contribution in 
the economy of the country.[10] While GDP per capita is about 4,100 United States Dollars 
 
* Emirjon Kaçaj, from Albania, is an international consultant on international law, human rights and labor-migration. 
He worked for several years for different United Nations entities and specialized agencies, including for the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, International Labour Organization, International 
Organization for Migration and the World Bank. He holds a Law Degree from the University of Milan in Italy and 
an LL.M. from the American University Washington College of Law. Emirjon has authored and co-authored several 
articles, studies and reports including on international human rights, labor, migration, trafficking in human beings 
and European legislation. He also carried out research on the right to vote from abroad, right to adequate housing, 
development finance and business and human rights. During his career, he has provided legal and policy advice to 
more than 100 institutions around the world on human rights related issues and continues to advocate for the human 
rights and study international law development. 
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(USD), each Albanian emigrant sent about 916 USD.[11] However, despite their contribution, 
Albanian migrants are not given the possibility to vote from abroad. 
Analysis 
The right to vote in Albania is entrenched in the Constitution.[12] Albania is party to the Council 
of Europe, which recognizes the right to vote in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention).[13] The European Court of 
Human Rights (European Court) noted that the right to vote requires states to take positive 
measures as opposed to merely refraining from interference.[14] The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe invited states to enable their citizens living abroad to vote during national 
elections.[15] 
A step back in affirming the right to vote from abroad was taken by the European Court’s Grand 
Chamber in Sitaropoulos.[16] The Court overruled the decision of the Chamber and denied the 
claim brought by Greek citizens requesting to vote in parliamentary elections while residing 
abroad.[17] While the Court acknowledged that thirty-seven members of the Council of Europe 
made arrangements for voting from abroad, it emphasized that these procedures were not uniform, 
i.e. polling stations set up abroad, postal voting, proxy voting, and electronic voting.[18] Hence, it 
affirmed that states were not required to provide for measures that allow their citizens to vote from 
abroad.[19] The Court’s ambiguous reasoning focused on the diversity of arrangements rather than 
on the fact that with diverse arrangements, states enabled their citizens to vote from abroad. 
However, the Court noted that a democratic state “must” be in favor of inclusion and measures 
that allow the exercise of the right to vote from abroad are “consonant” with the European 
Convention.[20] 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee noted that states must take effective measures to 
ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right.[21] The International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(ICMW) envisages the right to vote for migrant workers and members of their families in their 
state of origin.[22] Consequently, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) stressed the importance of ensuring the right to 
vote from abroad.[23] In 2010, the CMW expressed concern that Albanian emigrants could not 
exercise their vote from abroad and that this negatively affected the exercise of the right to 
vote.[24] Hence, the CWM recommended measures that ensure the exercise of the right to vote by 
Albanian migrant workers residing abroad.[25] Yet, no measures have been adopted by Albanian 
authorities to allow its citizens to vote from abroad. 
Conclusions 
Albanians residing abroad have been de facto excluded from electoral participation over the last 
few decades. With almost half of its population living abroad, the responsible Albanian state 
authorities are under an obligation to preserve the raison d’être of the right to vote by adopting 
positive measures to hold inclusive democratic elections.[26] 
While the European Court noted that states are not required to adopt positive measures to allow 
their citizens to vote from abroad, it underlined the importance of adopting such inclusive 
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measures.[27] Currently, 40 out of 47 members of the Council of Europe have adopted measures 
that regulate the exercise of the right to vote from abroad.[28] Even though there is no uniformity 
among these arrangements, certainly they share the same aim of inclusion by allowing citizens 
living abroad to participate in the electoral process. These arrangements go in line with the 
resolutions and recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as well 
as with the recommendation of the Venice Commission.[29] Additionally, these arrangements are 
in line with international instruments that require the adoption of positive measures enabling the 
effective enjoyment of rights.[30] 
Therefore, considering the progressive affirmation of the right to vote from abroad and in particular 
in the framework of the Council of Europe, Albanian authorities should undertake the necessary 
measures to enable their citizens to vote from abroad.[31] Within the given margin of appreciation 
in determining proper arrangements, consideration should be given to voting by mail, 
electronically, establishing polling stations in embassies and consulates, or other methods that 
ensure inclusive democratic elections. 
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